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1 The anthology gathers the results of a symposium held on the occasion of Hans Joas'
60th birthday in November 2008 at the Max-Weber-Kolleg in Erfurt. Its clear systematic
focus on the integration of the historicist and the pragmatist legacy in current social
theory marks a pleasant difference from the eclecticism of a typical festschrift.  The
editors succeeded in obliging all contributors to each take up and develop a specific
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aspect of the comparison of both theories. As a result, the contributions complement
each other extremely well and add up to a coherent overall impression.
2 I will first present several contributions I consider to be particularly innovative and
subsequently phrase a fundamental question regarding the relation of pragmatism and
action theory. The editors suggest in the introduction to interpret Joas’ oeuvre as an
attempt  to  merge  a  historicist  perspective  on  the  formation  of  social  orders  and
institutions  that  rejects  the  idea  of  objective  historico-philosophical  laws  of
progression with a pragmatist theory of action. They point out, however, that in Joas’
numerous  and  rich  analyses  in  the  fields  of  sociology  of  religion,  the  sociology  of
violence and the sociology of social norms, this metatheoretical bridge remains largely
implicit.
3 Against  this  backdrop,  the  contributions  of  the  anthology  strive  to  make  the
connection explicit.  The leading assumption is  that  both pragmatism and historism
could benefit from a dialogue that would allow for the historicist concept of experience
and the pragmatist concept of action to mutually revise each other: A concept of action
enhanced by experience theory could avoid the perils of a teleological reduction, while
a concept of experience enhanced by action theory conversely escapes the pitfalls of
relativism inherent in historism.
4 The first section of contributions addresses the “Legacy of Pragmatism and Historism”
in current social theory and is opened by Matthias Jung's “Verkörperte Intentionalität
– Zur Anthropologie des Handelns” [Incorporated Intentionality – On the Anthropology
of  Action].  Pragmatism  and  historism  are  complemented  here  by  philosophical
anthropology as well as recent cognitive science, which allows to not merely postulate
a continuity between human life as biological existence and as a “cultural form of life
mediated by symbols” (25), but to actually comprehend this continuity in detail. The
theory  of  socially  mediated intentionality  hinted at  in  Joas’  writings  could  thus  be
placed  on a  sound scientific  basis.  Jung claims  that  by  synthesizing  historicist  and
pragmatist  motives,  Joas  ceases  to  interpret  intentionality  in  a  mentalist  and
teleological  way.  Consequently,  and  as  opposed to  Husserl  and Searle,  he  does  not
interpret it as a basic, preexisting feature of the mind, but instead intents to show how
it emerges in the context of specific actions. According to Jung, Joas in The Creativity of
Action  conceptualizes  intentionality  as  “reflexive  articulation  and  continuous
adaptation of the sense of action” (28) in specific situations, and in doing so heeds the
pragmatist  as  well  as  anthropological  intuition  that  all  action  is  essentially
incorporated and situated. This situatedness implies a continuity of nature and culture
on one hand, and a continuity of action and experience on the other hand. Jung’s main
point is to show that this continuity can be further underpinned by recent results in
the  field  of  cognitive  science,  especially  Alva  Noë’s  encativism,  which  consistently
interprets perceptions as actions. Following the work of Michael Tomasello, Jung also
believes to be able to describe the transition from individual to collective intentionality
without  having  to  resort  to  mentalist  approaches:  In  “triangular  scenes  of  shared
attention”  (42),  where  “the  attention  of  the  child  and  the  attention  of  the  adult
oscillates between the interacting parties and an object of mutual interest,” collective
intentionality emerges from situated physical activity.
5 While this multiple comparison of theories is certainly thought-provoking, it does leave
the reader wondering whether Jung isn’t omitting several major differences between
cognitive science and pragmatism, as for example the tendency of cognitive science
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approaches  to  reduce  experience  to  a  mere  processing  of  information,  which  is
incompatible with the openness of the pragmatist concept of experience. Also, to speak
of an “anthropology” of pragmatism is far from innocent, as the efforts of at least parts
of the 20th century german-speaking anthropology to determine an essence of human
nature are hardly reconcilable with the acosmism and tychism of pragmatism (on the
incompatibility of anthropology and pragmatism see Rölli 2010).
6 Tychism is  also the main focus of  Richard Bernstein’s essay “Die kreative Rolle der
Imagination” [The Creative Role of Imagination], that places Joas’ theory of creative
action in the context of  classic  pragmatist  theories of  creativity.  In contrast  to the
common  myth  of  theoretical  decline  that  glorifies  Peirce  as  an  original  genius  of
pragmatism while scolding James, Dewey and Mead as end products of a watering down
of the pragmatist founding father’s insights, Bernstein shows that James’ and Dewey’s
creativity  theories  can  be  interpreted  as  original  and  congenial  transformations  of
Peirce's anti-necessarist cosmology.
7 The idea of the living option James unfolds in “The Will  to Believe”:  an unguarded
hypothesis that will only be justifiable post festum by the consequences of the actions it
initiated,  is  a  transformation  of  Peirce’s  Tychism,  as  is  James’  theory  of  the
pluriversum. Likewise, Peirce’s legacy is represented and developed further in new and
interesting ways in the vital role of imagination in Dewey’s theory of research as well as
his ideal of a creative democracy.
8 While Bernstein traverses all  three classics of  American pragmatism, Charles Camic
deliberately  chooses  a  smaller  section  for  his  contribution,  which  deals  with  the
transformations  of  Dewey’s  concept  of  intelligence  (“Wandlungen  des
Intelligenzbegriffs bei Dewey”). Camic also starts with a reading of Joas’ The Creativity of
Action as a theory of “creative intelligence” (71) strongly inspired by Dewey. He takes a
fascinating trip through the history of ideas of turn of the century Chicago, to the very
moment  when  Dewey,  at  that  time  still  strongly  influenced  by  Neo-Hegelianism,
transferred to the University of Chicago. He shows that three competing concepts of
intelligence  were  one  of  the  crucial  subjects  of  the  debates  taking  place  at  the
University  of  Chicago  during  that  time:  a  group  of  humanists  and  social  scientists
surrounding Albion Small, Charles Henderson and Thorstein Veblen tried to interpret
human intelligence as an autonomous capacity irreducible to animal intelligence. They
were opposed by a group of naturalists around C. O. Whitman and Henry Donaldson
that, being ardent Darwinists, instead tried to find continuities between human and
animal intelligence. Eventually, a third group of experimentalists (Charles Davenport,
Jacques Loeb and others) emerged. It shared the naturalist starting point, but argued
that  certain  phenomena  claimed  by  strict  naturalists  as  evidence  for  intelligence,
among them “purpose, reflex inhibition, […] structure of the nervous system” (78), in
and of themselves could not be interpreted as sufficient criteria for human intelligence.
Camic convincingly highlights the fact that although Dewey never intervened in those
debates during his Chicago era, it would leave a deep impression on his future theory.
According to Camic, Dewey’s own theory of intelligence, that was repeatedly modified
in  different  phases  of  his  work  and  is  based  on  the  elements  projection,  prediction, 
outline, inference and testing of hypotheses (see 85) rejects an assumption shared by all
three  parties  of  the  Chicago  debate:  that  intelligence  can  be  reduced  to  a  choice
between different options and a strategy of situational adaptation. In contrast, Dewey
places a much stronger emphasis on the imaginative and anticipative components of
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intelligence that – and here Camic seconds Bernstein’s contribution – are also pivotal
for a theory of creative action.
9 A second section of contributions is summarized under the heading “Historismus und
Pragmatismus:  Verschränkungen,  Fortführungen  und  Korrekturen”  [Historism  and
Pragmatism: Entwinements, Continuations and Corrections]. Its opener is a comparison
of  the  philosophies  of  religion  of  Dewey  and  Ernst  Troeltsch  by  Friedrich  Jaeger.
Dewey’s  pragmatist  philosophy of  religion is  interpreted here as  a  “version of  civil
religion” (108), whereas historist Troeltsch “does not permit himself a turn towards
civil  religion”  (108);  more  so  than  his  American  contemporary,  he  is  thus  able  to
account for the antinomies of the process of social modernization.
10 Dewey's  naturalistic  concept  of  god,  which  secularizes  god  “to  a  forward-striving
intentionality of human life practice” (117), leads to a “culturally religious system of
Social Gospel” (111) quite compatible with the “set of values of the American consumer
society”  and  thus  forfeits  the  critical  impetus  of  religion.  In  contrast,  Troeltsch’s
insistence on the autonomy of religion, according to which a strong community can
only  be  a  community  of  substantial  metaphysical  convictions  (see  118),  retains  a
stronger potential to object against the pathologies of modern society.
11 Hans-Joachim  Schneider  in  his  brilliant  essay  “Jenseits  von  Gemeinschaft  und
Gesellschaft:  Prozesse  der  Differenzierung  und  Individuierung  aus  der  Sicht  der
Chicago  School  of  Sociology”  [Beyond  Community  and  Society:  Processes of
Differentiation  and  Individuation  from  the  Perspective  of  the  Chicago  School  of
Sociology] points out the significance of pragmatist action theory for the emergence of
a reconstructive method within the Chicago School. His contribution aims to show that
the  Chicago  School,  based  on  Mead  and  Dewey,  was  able  to  conceptualize  the
connection between “sociation and individualization” (131) in a much more reflective
way than the contemporary European sociology,  whose protagonists,  Durkheim and
Weber, under a strong Neo-Kantian influence interpreted social integration mainly as
an unobstructed merging into social functional contexts and value systems.
12 Neither Durkheim nor Weber recognize any leeway for creative action that  doesn't
merely spot and utilize niches in the social fabric, but generates those niches in the
first place. By integrating Mead's and Dewey's theories of creative action into their
qualitative  analyses  on  migrant  workers,  criminals,  youth  groups,  new  forms  of
housing etc., the protagonists of the Chicago School in their material studies provide a
perspective  that  accounts  for  the  agency  of  the  actors  investigated  also  on  a
methodological level.  Schneider argues that Joas’  theory of creative action could be
reconstructed as the belated “theoretical approach underlying the empirical studies of
the Chicago School” (132). However, as a critical sideline it should be mentioned that,
being an action theoretical approach, it tends to lose its grounding in the empirical data
and explicitly does not proceed in terms of a grounded theory. Seeing that, it would be
more accurate to consider Joas at least not as the only successor of the Chicago School,
contrary to what Schneider suggests. Exponents of Cultural Studies such as Williams,
Hall,  Kellner, Grossberg and Fiske, whose theories of counter hegemonic action (see
Winter 2001) are acknowledged neither by Schneider nor Joas himself,  even though
they explicitly place themselves in the tradition of pragmatism (see e.g. Shusterman
2000; Salaverria 2007: 206ff.; Winter 2008).
13 Hans Peter Krüger in his contribution juxtaposes John Dewey’s and Helmuth Plessner’s
theories of the public sphere, which were developed roughly around the same time. He
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states  that  while  for  Dewey  a  public  sphere  emerges  every  time  a  third  person  is
affected by the consequences of a direct interaction between two others and begins to
critically reflect those consequences,  Plessner conceptualizes the public sphere as a
facilitation of personal conduct between “strangers who may remain strangers to each
other, who are not related among themselves and do not necessarily share the same set
of values” (160). Plessner’s and Dewey’s theories of the public sphere are much better
equipped to accommodate for the dual contingency of modern social conditions than a
Kantian theory, which would link the public sphere to the public use of one singular
reason. In contrast,  for Dewey and Plessner it is precisely the absence of a singular
reason  a  priori  encompassing  every  individual,  that  makes  public  debates  both
necessary and possible.
14 A  third  group  of  contributions  explores  historism  and  pragmatism  in  various
disciplinary  fields  [“Historismus  und  Pragmatismus  in  verschiedenen  disziplinären
Feldern”]. In constant dialogue with Joas’ more recent works on secularization, José
Casanova begins with the question “Welche Religion braucht der Mensch?” [What kind
of religion does man need?] and in doing so distances himself from the monism he
perceives to be underlying Joas’ complementary question: “Does man need religion?”
Casanova rephrases the preoccupation with religion (in singular) in the modern era (also
in  singular)  in  a  historist  way  and  breaks  it  down  to  several  pairs  of  conceptual
opposites: individual experience of transcendence versus the socially sacred, socially
undifferentiated communal cults versus differentiated religious communities, as well
as  religion  versus  magic.  None  of  these  historical  conceptual  constellations  can  be
reduced to one of the other two; and the complex interaction between them is reflected
both  in  the  sociological  classics,  which  can't  be  reduced to  a  singular  narrative  of
secularization, and in the religio-philosophical elaborations of the founding fathers of
pragmatism.
15 Hans Kippenberg in his contribution “Zur Kontingenz religiösen Gewalthandelns” [On
the contingency of  religious  Violence]  also  rejects  a  simplifying perspective  on the
relation of religion and modernity that informs for example Jan Assmann’s thesis of the
intrinsic violence of monotheism.
16 In  the  fourth  group  of  essays,  which  is  summarized  under  the  heading  “Zwischen
Dilthey und Mead: Hans Joas und die gegenwärtige Sozialtheorie” [Between Dilthey and
Mead: Hans Joas and current Social Theory], Wolfgang Knöbl’s exploration of macro
theory  between  pragmatism  and  historism  (“Makrotheorie  zwischen  Pragmatismus
und Historismus”) stands out as particularly remarkable and is also the most accurate
realization of the theoretical program phrased by the editors in the introduction. The
essay first states a “crisis of macrosociology” (273), which has almost completely ceased
to develop since Habermas and Luhmann. As evidence, he cites Renate Mayntz’s thesis
that  “when  reconstructing  macro  processes,  one always  has  to  bear  in  mind
multicausal  causation  as  well  as  the  historicity  and  processuality  of  the  macro
phenomena in question” (274), which, according to Knöbl, leads Mayntz into a kind of
macrosociological  skepticism.  But  this  skepticism regarding the “basic  principles  of
social reality” (275) is running danger to misconceive social reality just as much as a
complementary historico-philosophical dogmatism. Knöbl interprets Joas’ attempt to
turn  the  concept  of  contingency  itself  into  the  central  macrosociological
methodologeme on the basis of pragmatism and historism as a possible solution to this
dilemma.  The  (Hegelian)  objective  laws  of  historical  progress  that  keep  making  an
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impact on macro-sociology could then finally be abandoned “in favor of analyzing the
specific  contextual  conditions  of  the  formation  and  generation  of  newly  appearing
social  processes”  (295)  (–  a  historism  almost  reminiscent  of  Foucault).  Knöbl  then
points out that while Joas has not yet  performed this  turn towards a “contingency
sensitive macrosociology” (300), it is hinted at in his more recent work. Contingency
then would play the role of  “the macrosociological  counterpart  to the creativity of
action” (307).
17 While overall the anthology is inspiring in every respect, it must be critically remarked
that it does not take note of earlier attempts to join historism and pragmatism, as for
example Ferdinand Fellmann’s ambitious project to move Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy
close  to  Peirce,  James  and  Dewey  (see  Fellmann  1991).  The  recent  international
discussion regarding the relevance of pragmatism for qualitative social research (for a
resume e.g. Frega 2011) could also have enriched some of the contributions.
18 A concluding  question  concerns  the  tacit  assumption  of  most  authors  (who herein
follow Joas) that pragmatism can be adequately interpreted as action theory.  In stark
contrast  to  Richard  Bernstein’s  attempt  to  distinguish  action  from  practice  (see
Bernstein 1971) by arguing that practice was never able to shed the Marxist legacy of
objective  determinants  whereas  action  connotes  free  and  self-opinionated  actors,  I
think that  pragmatism is  described more accurately  as  a  theory of  practice  than a
theory of action. Aristotle considers practice as an act that is collective, contingent (he
repeatedly classifies it as that realm of being where things could always be different),
and an end in itself that can be neither reduced to extra-practical foundations nor ever
entirely transparent on a theoretical level (see Hetzel 2008). From the perspective of
philosophical  action  theories  (and  I  suspect  that  theories  of  communicative  and
creative action are included here), a subject that already exists prior to practice makes
use  of  specific  means  to  realize  its  intentions  by  manipulating  social  situations  in
accordance with social norms. In this manner, actions are ultimately conceptualized as
based on the acting subject, and in so doing the subject is elevated to a condition of
possibility  of  action.  Joas  and  his  followers  in  their  self-characterization  as  action
theorists seem to pursue precisely this legacy adopted from Weber and Habermas. But
this is a difficult legacy to reconcile with classic pragmatism, which is centered on a
concept  of  experience  that  rejects  the  idea  of  an  autonomously  acting  subject.
Experience in general constitutes e.g. for Dewey a “complete interpenetration of self
and world of objects and events” (Dewey 2005: 18), an interpenetration that no longer
allows to distinguish a subject-pole of experience from an object-pole on more than a
merely heuristic level.  With direct reference to James, Dewey writes: “Experience is
‘double-barreled’ in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act
and material,  subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality”
(Dewey 1958: 8). The “place” of experience for Dewey lies in the act of experiencing
itself  rather than within the subject that makes the experience.  One could say that
Dewey unfounds or desubjectivates experience: experience as “doing and undergoing
in alternation” (Dewey 2005: 46) can’t be adequately described in terms of action theory
nor  perception  theory.  While  making  an  experience,  the  subject  does  not  exist
beforehand in order to later make an experience, but emerges only along with it: it is
undergoing rather than actively “making” the experience.
19 This conceptual  design corresponds more to theoretical  endeavors like Whitehead’s
process  philosophy,  Cornelius  Castoriadis’  theory  of  a  social  imaginary,  the  actor-
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networktheory (on its pragmatist legacy most recently Wieser 2012), the philosophy of
Deleuze and Guattari (whose proximity to pragmatism is pointed out in Rölli 2008) or a
deconstructivist social theory (see Mouffe 1996) than to the action-theoretical tradition
that for Joas includes authors like Parsons, Weber, Durkheim, Tönnies and Simmel. His
creative action is an addition to the rationally and normatively orientated actions this
tradition  explores  much  rather  than  a  transgression  of  the  action  theoretical
framework as such. I don’t mean to imply that the subject- and action-critical tradition
I  have  cited  above  is  the  only  possible  alternative  to  action  theory.  I  do  believe,
however,  that  a  dialogue  between  subject-critical  theories  of  practice  and  subject-
centered theories of action would deepen the socialtheoretical reception of pragmatism
beyond the scope of what the – otherwise groundbreaking – contributions of Handlung
und Erfahrung have already accomplished.1
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